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CASE NOTES
of Common Pleas construed this section as imposing liability on the individual
signer since the instrument failed to clearly show that he signed only on
behalf of another named on the paper."
The New Jersey Legislature, which is currently considering adoption
of the UCC, has established a Commission to study the Code. In its report
to the Legislature, the Commission referred to the "unfortunate rule" in
New Jersey whereby parol evidence could be used to exonerate the agent,
even in cases where a holder in due course had acquired the instrument, and
said that such rule had been reversed by the Appellate Division in the present
case. 18
 (The New Jersey Supreme Court's reversal of the Appellate Division
had not yet been announced.)
In any event, skillful execution by an agent or other representative in-
tending to bind only his principal, should follow the illustration contained in
Comment 3 (c) to UCC Section 3-403: "Peter Pringle, by Arthur Adams,
Agent." It might also be advisable to use the name of the intended maker,
rather than the customary "we," in the promissory section of the body of
the instrument. With these safeguards, non-liability of the authorized repre-
sentative will be assured, regardless of the jurisdiction.
ROBERT J. ROBERTORY
Sales—Written Warranties Received Subsequent to Consummation of
Sale—Rights of Buyer Unaffected.—Sensabaugb v. Morgan Brothers
Farm Supply.'—Defendant-contractor purchased a bulldozer and loader
from plaintiff, authorized dealer of J. I. Case Company, and signed sales
contracts which contained no references to warranties. Upon subsequent de-
livery of the machines, defendant received manuals of instructions, each
containing a warranty and warranty-disclaimer clause printed on the back
cover. The clause limited J. I. Case's liability to a computable period of
time and disclaimed the existence of any other warranties "express, implied
or statutory." The manuals were not filled out or signed, nor did either
identify any particular purchase or machine. Plaintiff-dealer brought suit
for balance of purchase price of the two machines. Defendant-purchaser,
who had experienced considerable mechanical difficulty with the machines,
counterclaimed for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The trial
court held that the defendant-purchaser was bound and limited by the ex-
press warranty-disclaimer on the back cover of the manual. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed. HELD: the mere delivery of a printed
and unexecuted warranty-disclaimer form after the sale has been consum-
mated does not bind the parties. The case was remanded for a determination of
17 Grange Nat'l Bank v. Conville, supra note 11.
18 Report of the (New Jersey Legislative) Commission to Study and Report Upon
the Uniform Commercial Code 284 (1960).
1 165 A.2d 914 (Md. 1960).
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whether there existed express verbal warranties or an implied warranty of
merchantability.
Under the common law a statement made subsequent to the bargain is
without binding force upon the parties. The seller's liability on a warranty
is based upon the contract wherein consideration and reliance are essential.
If the statement is unknown to the buyer at the time the sale is consummated,
it is manifest that no consideration is given for it and no reliance made upon
it. If no warranty is made at the time of the sale, a subsequent warranty will
be valid only if new consideration is given for it. 2
The Uniform Sales Act, Section 12, 3 follows the common law approach.
Construing this provision, the court in Smith Company v. Fisher Plastics
Corp.4 concluded: "The Uniform Sales Act defines a warranty as an affirma-
tion of a fact relating to the goods if the natural tendency of such affirma-
tion is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if he purchases relying
thereon. A statement of fact made after title to the goods had passed to the
buyer cannot be construed as a warranty relating back to the time of the
sale." Thus, under the common law or the Uniform Sales Act, an express
warranty must be within the cognizance of both parties at the time the
contract is negotiated.
The Uniform Commercial Code continues this approach, as evidenced
by Section 2-313(1)(a), which reads: "Express warranties by the seller are
created as follows: (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty . . . ." A statement unknown to the
buyer cannot become part of the basis of the bargain.
The common law doctrine concerning statements made subsequent to
the bargain applies to disclaimers as well as warranties. After a contract to
sell has been entered into, a unilateral disclaimer is ineffectual.° This is not
to say that disclaimer is denied the vendor. Since warranty is a contractual
matter, it is held at common law that the parties are free to make their own
agreement and to negate an implied warranty that would otherwise exist .°
2 i Williston, Sales § 211 (rev. ed. 1948). Williston, What Constitutes An Express
Warranty In The Law of Sales, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 555, 573-74 (1908).
3 Corresponds to Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 30 (1957).
4 76 F. Supp. 641 (D. Mass. 1948).
5 Distillers Distributing Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 180 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.
1950); Landman v. Bloomer, 117 Ala. 312, 23 So. 75 (1898); Edgar v. Breck, 172 Mass.
581, 52 N.E. 1083 (1899); Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W.
484 (1917); Ward v. Valker, 44 N.D. 598, 176 N.W. 129 (1920) ; Diepeveen v. Vogt,
Inc., 27 N.J. Super. 254, 99 A.2d 329 (1953); Bell v. Mills, 78 App. Div. 42, 80 N.Y. Supp.
34 (1902); Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, 255 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923);
Ingraham v. Associated Oil Co., 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 645 (1932).
8 Baglehole v. Walters, 3 Camp. 154, 170 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1811) ; Shepherd v.
Kain, 5 B. and Aid. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180 (1821) ; J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v.
McClamrock, 152 N.C. 405, 67 S.E. 991 (1910); Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Mahon
and Robinson, 13 N.D. 516, 101 N.W. 903 (1904).
But see, Comment, Last Stop for the Disclaimer, 2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 133
(1960), and cases cited therein.
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Such disclaimer must, however, be fairly brought home to the buyer before
the contract is concluded.?
Under the Uniform Sales Act, for a disclaimer to be effective, it must be
arrived at by "express agreement," negativing any attempted unilateral in-
sertion of a disclaimer subsequent to the agreement.°
The Uniform Commercial Code follows the common law and Sales Act
in permitting the parties to make their own contract.° Although under Sec-
tion 2-209(1) of the Code there need not be new consideration to support
a modification of a contract, nevertheless, such modification must be by
"agreement," again countering any attempted unilateral modification.
It is therefore apparent that if a manufacturer or vendor is of a mind to
limit his liability by use of a disclaimer of warranty, such disclaimer must be
made a part of the sales bargain and cannot be unilaterally inserted into the
bargain subsequent to its consummation. Typical day to day attempts to
accomplish this very task, nevertheless, include the use of printed disclaimers
on manufacturer's stationery," enclosed in packaged goods, 12
 on bills pre-
sented upon delivery of goods," pasted on delivered containers," or printed
on invoices or shipping tags," all ineffectual.
As shown above, for the same reasons that such subsequent statements
of disclaimer are ineffective in protecting the seller, subsequent statements of
warranty are equally ineffective in benefiting the buyer. The law on the
subject would appear to be well settled and yet the very type of "warranty"
here involved presents itself to the average citizen repeatedly. There are
probably innumerable consumer-holders of unenforceable warranties, that is,
certificates received upon purchase and carefully packaged with the item, or
received some time after delivery of the item.
It would appear that if the consumer wants to take advantage of the
written warranty he must ask, before the sale is closed, whether or not the
item is protected by a warranty and if so, what the terms are, or in some
manner incorporate the warranty into the bargain. Of course, so far as the
buyer is concerned, the written warranty is not usually vital. Frequently
there is sufficient sales talk and reliance thereon to establish an express war-
7
 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117,
157-58 (1943).
8
 Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited as USA) § 71: "Where any right, duty or
liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be
negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealings between the
parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract
or the sale."
g UCC § 2-316(2): ". . to exclude or modify the implied warranty of mer-
chantability a writing must be conspicuous
	 . ."
10
 UCC § 2-209(1): "An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs
no consideration to be binding."
11
 Distillers Distributing Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., supra note 5.
12 Diepeveen v. Vogt and Bell v. Mills, supra note 5.
13
 Edgar v. Breck, supra note 5.
14 Ingraham v. Associated Oil Co., supra note 5.
15
 Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., supra note 5.
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ranty," and if not, the law prescribes implied warranties of merchantability"
and, in certain instances, of fitness for a particular purpose."
SCOTT R. FOSTER
Statutory Change—Effect of Upon a Prior Consent Decree—Equity.-
System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees' Dept. v. 1Vright. 1—In
1945 twenty-eight nonunion employees of the Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road sought an injunction and $140,000 in damages against the employer rail-
road and a number of unions representing the employees, alleging certain dis-
criminatory practices directed towards them by reason of their nonmembership
in the union. The parties entered into a consent decree and the plaintiffs re-
ceived $5,000 in consideration thereof. The decree specifically enjoined
discrimination against said plaintiffs because of their refusal to join or to
continue membership in the unions. At the time of entry of the decree Sec-
tions 2(4) and 2(5) of the Railway Labor Act' were in effect. These sections
specifically prohibited negotiations for the purpose of entering into a union
shop agreement. The present action was instituted for the purpose of modi-
fying this decree to allow the prior defendants to negotiate for a union shop.
The petitioners relied on the 1951 Amendment to the Railway Labor Acts
16 Williston, What Constitutes An Express Warranty In The Law of Sales, supra
note 2.
17 USA § 15(2): "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals in goods of that description . . . there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be of merchantable quality." UCC § 2-314(1): ". . . a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind . . . ."
18 USA § 15(1): "Where the buyer . . makes known to the seller the particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
the seller's judgment . . . there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably
fit for such purpose." UCC § 2-315: "Where the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there
is ... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose."
I 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
2 Section 2(4) making it, ". . unlawful for any carrier ... to influence or
coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or
remain members of any labor organization. . . ."
Section 2(5) "No carrier . . . shall require any person seeking employment to sign
any agreement . . . promising to join or not to join a labor organization; . . . ." 44
Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
3 Section 2(11) ". . . any carrier	 • and a labor organization . 	 shall be
permitted—
(a) to make agreements requiring as a condition of continued employment
that . . all employees shall become members of a labor organization.
. • . Provided, that no such agreement shall require such condition of
employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not avail-
able upon the same terms as are generally applicable to any other member
or to employees with respect to whom membership was denied for any
reason, other than failure of the employee to tender periodic dues,
etc. ..." 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
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